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We will now give a number of examples that relate to the four types of funding.
Q1: planned, input-based funding through providers
This represents a centralised system of funding, where contracts are signed up between the funding agency and HEIs, with HEIs agreeing to deliver graduates for targeted labour market needs. When entering into a contract, the funding agency will make sure it obtains the services it wants (usually with an eye on labour market requirements) for a reasonable price. In this way the cost-effectiveness of the delivery is stressed. In the contract, both parties express that they will obey certain criteria. Only if these criteria are fulfilled, the HEI will receive core funding. The criteria may concern the types and qualifications of students admitted to the HEI, the (maximum) level of tuition fees (if any) charged by the institution, and the commitment made by the HEI towards its students in the instruction and teaching processes.
Q2: demand-driven, input-based funding through clients
This funding system makes use of vouchers. The core funds of HEIs are supplied through the clients of HEIs. Students obtain vouchers which can be traded for educational services (i.e. educational consumption) at the HEI of their own choice. For the HEI the vouchers represent a certain value - they can be cashed at the Ministry of Education. Each (prospective) student is given a limited number of vouchers, representing a value which can be used up in a flexible way (during a certain period of time and for programmes supplied by a given number of accredited education providers). In this funding system it is the consumer that drives the system - the system is demand-driven. The client (student) decides what institution to attend and what programmes to enrol in. The HEIs have to take care of the quality of their teaching and their supply of courses, because unattractive programmes will not receive sufficient funding. The voucher system can be combined - like many other funding variants - with a system of differentiated course fees. The HEIs then will charge the students a certain percentage of the course costs. Tuition fees may be regulated to some extent by the government. Charging fees will make students pay attention to the quality of the service they get from the HEI. So, combining vouchers and fees may result in a system which is responsive to individual students' participation wants.
Q3: performance-based funding of providers
In this example of a performance-based funding system a formula is used that generates funds for institutions that are successful in terms of their students passing exams. Depending on the number of credits (i.e. weighted number of passed courses) accumulated by their students and the subject categories concerned a budget is flowing to the HEI. This type of model is operating in Denmark (taximeter model), while in Sweden a mix of enrolment numbers and credits determines the funds allocated to HEIs. In the Netherlands, a mix of the number of first-year students ('freshmen') and the number of Master's degrees conferred determines the funds allocated to the universities.
Q4: purpose-specific purchasing from providers
In this example of a market-oriented funding system HEIs are invited to submit tenders for a given supply of graduates. The tenders which are selected by the funding agency are the ones that are the most price-competitive. In this tendering process, HEIs are encouraged to compete with one another to provide education and training to meet national needs.
Looking at the classification scheme presented here, it is good to note that vouchers are a way of funding education that can be described as input-oriented and at the same time demand-oriented. This implies that the goal of stressing performance receives less explicit attention compared to a scheme such as Q3.
1.3 Research question and outline of this paper
The taxonomy of funding schemes presented in section 1.2 automatically brings us to the question"what funding scheme would be best equipped to achieve the aims of strengthening student choice and efficiency in the market for higher education?" For this paper, we will mainly be concerned with the pros and cons of voucher schemes. Therefore, the central research question of this paper is:
In order to answer this question, section 2.1 first gives a more precise definition of the voucher concept. Section 2.2 lists some of the theoretical arguments in favour of vouchers, as well as some of the drawbacks. For basic (i.e. compulsory) education, several voucher schemes have been put forward in the literature (see section 2.3). For higher education (section 2.4), voucher schemes are more rare. The schemes that have been proposed in theory differ in terms of the amount of regulation, the provision of information and the issue of whether vouchers are targeted especially at disadvantaged groups. Practical experiences with vouchers are very rare. Section 3 first presents some examples from compulsory education (section 3.1), and then continues with higher education (section 3.2). In section 4, we return to the basic research question: are vouchers any good? What conditions and arguments do we have to take into consideration when planning to introduce of vouchers and are there any alternatives to vouchers? We will try to answer these questions keeping in mind the trends outlined in section 1.1 It will become clear that the answer to these questions depends largely in the characteristics of the voucher scheme considered, such as who receives the vouchers, where can they be cashed, what is the investment students will have to make themselves, how long do vouchers retain their value, et cetera. The type of voucher scheme will largely determine its potential (or expected) effects.
2 Education vouchers
2.1 What are education vouchers?
In section 1.2 we observed that a voucher scheme represents a specific way
of funding (higher) education. Instead of the government allocating subsidies
directly to the providers of education, the government is channelling the subsidies
through the consumers. The former -- object subsidies -- represents the most
common way of allocating public money to education. The latter represents a
way of subsidising the producers (schools, universities), while the financial
resources are channelled through the subjects (parents, students) who can only
spend the money on education. A voucher, in fact, is an object-subject subsidy,
because unlike in the case of unrestricted money transfers made to individuals,
the receivers of the vouchers do not experience an increase of their free disposable
income.
In a voucher scheme the consumer receives a coupon (voucher) which represents
a certain amount of money to be spent on education. The voucher is a kind of"coupon
with a prescribed purchasing power, over a specified service" (Blaug, 1967).
The value of the voucher is related to some notion of the average per capita
costs of (a specified amount of) education. When a student chooses for a specific
institution of higher education (HEI), the HEI redeems the value of the voucher(s)
from the Ministry of Science and Education. The effect of vouchers is that HEIs
are forced to acquire means by attracting vouchers from students. Providers
are forced to compete and students (or pupils) are encouraged to seek the provider
that best satisfies their demands. In doing so they can choose from a range
of providers.
Some authors, like West (1996), use a much broader definition of vouchers.
In their definition one can speak of a voucher system whenever "funds follow
the child (or student)". This includes all arrangements in which governments
make either direct or indirect payments to an educational institution whenever
a student (or pupil) enrols in that institution. However, in our definition
we exclude the direct payments and restrict ourselves only to the indirect payments.
Thus, an essential element of a voucher scheme is that individual students are
receiving government subsidies -- either in terms of real money, or in terms
of entitlements to a given amount of education -- to be spent at the educational
institution of their choice. Vouchers thus are a form of demand side
funding. Student choice drives the funding. According to the broad definition
of West a system of funding educational institutions on the basis of a formula
where the number of students (or pupils) is the central parameter (i.e. the
funding base) would also be a form of voucher funding. In our view, however,
this would be regarded as a form of supply side funding. Following the
voucher definition of West, voucher systems might be said to exist in quite
a lot of higher education systems, e.g. in Chile, the Netherlands, or Sweden
(see Carnoy, 1998; Parry, 1996 and 1997). However, in our less broad definition,
these are examples of countries where in fact the supply side receives
the government subsidies.
The crucial aspect of the voucher idea is freedom to choose and this,
according to Barr (1998), would require that education is not just provided
by public institutions but also -- or at least in part -- by private
institutions. So, students would be allowed to cash their vouchers also at private
institutions that -- just like the public ones -- comply with minimum quality
standards.
2.2 Pros and cons of vouchers
There is no ideal method of funding education. Every system of funding arrangements
has its advantages and shortcomings, partly related to the set of goals the
government is pursuing. Moreover, the balance of argument changes over time.
Dissatisfaction with the existing systems of (public) funding - e.g. no freedom
of school choice in compulsory education with respect to public schools - has
led, especially in the United States, to a number of suggestions for change,
and perhaps the most prevalent of these has been suggesting the provision of
vouchers for education (see section 3).
Vouchers for education is not a new idea. West (1967) traces its origin back
to Tom Paine's Right of Man (1790), although recent interest in the idea
dates from the 1960s. In fact, there are many different voucher schemes, even
though the differences are sometimes small. The modern development of the idea
is usually attributed to Friedman (1962), an economist strongly committed to
market forces as a means of allocating resources (see section 2.3). The most
influential of other voucher versions usually is associated with the name of
Jencks (1970).
Especially in the United States, and to a much lesser extent in the United
Kingdom, a sometimes heated discussion has been pursued between proponents and
antagonists of education vouchers. Both sides, however, agree that the effects
of a voucher system would depend on the precise details of any scheme that might
be introduced. In Mason's (1975) words: ¡§It is impossible to generalise from
a particular voucher plan as the outcomes are a function of the very specific
arrangements inherent in any particular plan".
Even though the majority of articles about vouchers address vouchers in primary
and secondary education and literature on vouchers in higher education is very
rare, we will address some of the pros and cons of vouchers. Some of the arguments
may perhaps be less relevant for post-compulsory education (including higher
education), but it is good to take notice of them when addressing the relevance
of vouchers for higher education.
advantages of vouchers
The most important argument put forward in favour of vouchers is that they
would increase freedom of choice. There is a widespread belief among economists,
even those who do not necessarily support vouchers, that education is producer
dominated in the sense that decisions as to curriculum, for example, are taken
largely by teachers or professors, and that parents or students can do little
but respond to an existing situation. It is argued that just as a market system
provides the kinds of goods the consumers demand, its extension to education
would also force the providers of education to respond to the wishes of parents
or students. Under a voucher scheme, the suppliers of (higher) education would
be more responsive to the needs and preferences of their customers. This would
help to create a wider variety and flexibility in the provision of education.
Education institutions would have to provide more information to parents and
students on the quality of their services, thus strengthening the choices made
by their clients and increasing the effectiveness of schooling.
The educational institutions which provide the kind of education that people
want, will attract relatively more clients (pupils; students) and hence have
more money to secure their existence. Successful providers would be able to
raise the quality of their services (e.g. by spending on equipment or the teachers'
salaries), or perhaps to be able to make a profit. Vouchers would enforce the
discipline of the market on the providers of education, just as it does on the
producers of automatic coffee makers. The introduction of market forces leads
to competition and competition will strengthen efficiency, because only the
most cost-effective providers will be able to survive.
Protagonists of education vouchers often mention another advantage, namely
that a voucher system will allow more money to be spent on education, even in
times of financial stringency. If parents are allowed to"top up" the value of
the voucher provided from public funds, then the total amount spent on education
will increase, because many parents would be prepared to supplement vouchers
out of their own private income.
Some proponents of a voucher system also claim that vouchers would encourage
greater quality of opportunity. The reason for this is that inequality of opportunity
is caused by the inability of the lower income family to buy itself out of a
bad school and into a good one. Greater quality of opportunity would at the
same time lead to racial integration. Open-administration policies (with over-subscribed
schools allocated by lottery) and minimum minority enrolments in participating
schools have been proposed to avoid racial pitfalls. The schools would be more
responsive to the educational needs of minority groups (Davis, 1983).
disadvantages of vouchers
On the other hand, opponents of education vouchers have numerous arguments
against the introduction of vouchers. The first argument, regarding the issue
of choice, is that parents are not competent to choose schools and to assess
the quality of education provided, either because they are likely to be seduced
by flashy marketing or because issues such as the curriculum are a matter for
professionals.
Another argument against vouchers is that choice in education is limited by
geographical factors in many areas. In rural areas there is often one school
within reasonable travelling distance. Puckett (1983) notices that, curiously,
the major voucher models under discussion have nothing to say about rural school
participation in either a state-wide or nation-wide voucher program. Most voucher
proponents have a metropolitan situation where diversity is possible (at least
in theory) in mind. According to Puckett, in the U.S. voucher-type programmes
have actually been in place for decades in rural areas (e.g., in Vermont). Such
programmes have been implemented without the"fanfare" surrounding the Friedman
and Jencks proposals (see section 2.3). In these rural areas a school district
that only can afford one elementary public school, for example, allows parents
to choose a school in neighbouring districts and then pays their expenses.
There are two additional arguments against the statement that a voucher system
would increase freedom of choice. Firstly, according to Wagner (1974), choice
is limited. He argues that all a voucher will do is to allow parents to state
their preferences. If particular schools are over-subscribed then the actual
decision will be made by someone else. In his opinion, increased parental choice,
if required, can be provided for administratively without the need for a complicated
system of vouchers. Wagner notes that the fundamental lesson about parental
choice is that effective choice depends on resources. If there are sufficient
resources to allow spare places in popular schools, then choice can be ensured
without any need for vouchers. If no spare places are available, then a system
of vouchers will not create them.
Secondly, preferences may be incompatible. Allowing choice to one parent may
deny it for another. For example, parent A wants co-education and parent B chooses
single education. This may be impossible, because two small schools can be hopelessly
uneconomic.
Another argument against vouchers has been formulated by Hough (1987). He argues
that the longer-term effects of the introduction of education vouchers would
be that the popular schools would need to expand, contract more buildings, appoint
more staff, whilst the unpopular (public) schools would decline in number or
even have to close. This will result in an inevitable waste and additional expenses
with places available in half empty schools. In general, vouchers would confront
schools with massive fluctuations in funding and enrolment, meaning that teachers
would suffer from non-professional interference and job insecurity.
Also it is suggested that elementary school teachers would be tempted to re-orient
their teaching in order to produce those results seen as desirable to those
middle-class parents who are most likely to exercise influence and choice at
the expense, for example, of giving extra attention to disadvantaged or slow
learning pupils.
Even some proponents of voucher schemes, like Levin (1998) come to the conclusion
that the costs of an overall voucher system appear to exceed those of the present
system. Levin concludes that"the shift from the existing system to a voucher
system with a well-functioning school market place in which adequate transportation
and information is provided will demand considerable additional resources for
education beyond those allocated for educational vouchers and instructional
services". Levin and Driver (1997) estimate that the public costs of a voucher
scheme in a representative US context could raise public educational costs by
25% or more.
Most voucher models claim to ameliorate social disjunction. Opponents of voucher
schemes, however, claim that the opposite will be the case. Vouchers would increase
segregation, because all major voucher models contain mechanisms of economic
and racial segregation. Society, from a moral and political view, can decide
that choice on the basis of racial grounds is unacceptable, but choice on the
basis of curricula, religious and moral values, or intellectual ability will
lead to outcomes that strengthen segregation. Families that are better-off will
be more likely to take advantage of school choice, leaving the worse-off behind
(Puckett, 1983; Waring, 1996).
A final argument against a voucher scheme is that it would be accompanied by
practical difficulties, especially because of additional administrative efforts.
Vouchers imply a large effort in terms of keeping track of individual training
careers.
final remarks
From the short overview of pros and cons to vouchers it is difficult to formulate
a conclusion on the relevance of vouchers in general. Even more so, because
the effects generated by the voucher scheme will very much depend on the exact
characteristics of the scheme (Oosterbeek, 1998). A large variety of voucher
schemes can be identified. Johnes (1993), starting from a list of twelve basic
questions that relate to the lay-out of the voucher scheme, argues that, depending
on the answers given to these questions, over 4000 different voucher schemes
can be identified. All of the questions relate to government regulation
issues. Some of the most important regulation issues are: (a) the issue whether
the voucher covers the full cost or only part of the cost of the programme or
the educational institution, (b) whether there is some form of preferential
treatment for disadvantaged families, (c) the selection mechanism used to allocate
student places in schools that are over-subscribed, (d) whether all parents
can re-choose schools each year, (e) whether both public and private providers
are included in the system, (f) the range of programmes that is covered by the
system, (g) whether educational providers are allowed to charge fees on top
of the voucher; et cetera.
Clearly all of these -- and a lot of other -- issues are important and would
require detailed consideration if a voucher system were to be introduced. The
next section describes a few of the voucher systems that were put forward in
literature.
2.3 Voucher models
Especially for compulsory education, several different voucher proposals have
been put forward in literature. Below we will discuss three well-known voucher
models for financing compulsory education. For higher education, voucher schemes
are rare. The most elaborated and consistent plan seems to be the model proposed
by Levin (1983). This model, containing five key elements, will be presented
in the next section.
Two schools of thought
Ever since Milton Friedman published his ideas, the voucher concept has received
a lot of attention from contemporary economists. Friedman was the first economist
credited with the idea of educational vouchers as a means of restoring market
competition in education, while still having the government supply financial
support. Following Friedman, several other economists, especially from the U.S.
and the U.K., have further analysed the voucher concept. In fact, two schools
of thought corresponding to two dominant final objectives of the voucher, namely
the liberal market approach and the social policy approach, can
be distinguished, represented by Friedman and, respectively, Jencks. The liberal
market approach has dominated the discussions in both the U.K. and Australia.
In the U.S. both approaches coexist.
An important similarity between the approaches of Friedman and -- on the other
hand -- Jencks is that both are aware of the fact that the lack of competition
in the public sector has an ossifying effect. Uneasiness exists about the constraining
influence of bureaucratised education on individual parental decision-making.
The only way for schools to perform better is -- according to both Friedman
and Jencks -- a subjection of schools to more competitive pressure. Levin (1968)
puts it in the following way: ¡§The fact that the new left (Jencks) and the
old right (Friedman) can occur on the same educational palliative is reason
enough to consider the market approach as a serious alternative to the present
system".
The market model of Friedman
Friedman (1962) distinguishes between three kinds of education: compulsory
education, higher education and vocational training. With regard to compulsory
education he argues that this has to be funded by"giving parents vouchers redeemable
for a specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on 'approved' educational
services". Regarding higher education, Friedman presents a similar proposal.
Furthermore, he advocates freedom of price fixing (i.e. the setting of fees)
by the institutions. In Friedman's version the value of the voucher is the same
for each child, and it can be spent in any school that has been approved to
take part in the system. This would include both private and publicly owned
institutions. The schools are allowed to charge supplementary fees on top of
the value of the voucher and have complete freedom in their choice of pupils
and organisation of waiting lists (entry requirements, selection mechanism).
According to Friedman the advantage of his voucher scheme is an increase of
more effective competition between schools, resulting in an efficiency improvement,
less claims of private schools on governmental financial assistance, and better
opportunities to control governmental expenditure for education.
With respect to vocational training, Friedman argues that there are no 'neighbourhood
effects' (i.e. external effects) which would call for government funding. He
claims that vocational training is an investment in human capital, analogous
to investments in physical capital. Therefore, he advocates the establishment
of a fund (a loan facility, or individual learning account) on which students
have a drawing right. Repayment of the borrowed money should be related to the
additional income that graduates earn as a result of the vocational training
they received.
This concise description of Friedman's ideas about vouchers and the funding
of education shows that he proceeds from a strict neo-classical framework. He
pays a great deal of attention to efficiency issues and less to issues of equity,
such as access to (higher) education. In Friedman's voucher scheme, schools
(or universities) are allowed to charge additional fees. This may lead to the
effect that lower income groups can not afford to send their children to high-tuition
schools. This 'shortcoming' has lead others to propose amendments to the Friedman
voucher scheme.
The income-linked market model of Peacock and Wiseman
A well-known amendment of Friedman's scheme is the voucher model of Peacock
and Wiseman (1964). Although in their model freedom of choice for consumers
of education is also a central issue, at the same time they are aware of the
importance of access to education. Accessibility may become an issue if consumers,
as a consequence of the right of schools to set their own tuition fees, have
to pay higher fees than the value of their vouchers. Access to education then
may become income-linked. In order to avoid such 'unfair' effects, Peacock and
Wiseman propose to consider a voucher as a part of the taxable income ¡§¡K so
that under a progressive income tax system the rich would not retain its full
money". Of course, the most important question remains whether an income-linked
voucher scheme does justice to the differences between income groups with respect
to the ability to pay.
The principal element in this model is that the value of the voucher is higher
for children from low-income families by making the voucher value subject to
income taxation. However, although Peacock and Wiseman acknowledge the equality
of opportunity as an important social objective, they explicitly opt for a liberal
market approach.
In practice it is unlikely that the difference between the voucher issued to
low- and higher-income families would represent the difference in purchasing
power between low- and higher-income families. Jencks (1970) notes in this context
that"legislatures may provide poor parents with slightly larger vouchers than
rich parents, but (¡K) the difference is not likely to compensate the poor for
their inability to spend private funds on education".
The compensatory market model of Jencks
Jencks is the most articulate representative of the social policy approach,
that emphasises the equality of educational opportunity as a policy objective.
In Jencks' opinion vouchers would offer an alternative for the failing public
schools and would favour the relatively poor parents. The model he proposed
has three main characteristics:
It favours the market and competition among suppliers, but market competition
ought to be regulated to become effective. It introduces a compensatory element in order to avoid economic, religious
and racial barriers and to promote social mobility between classes. Schools where demand exceeds supply must allocate at least half of their
places by ballot.
The compensatory model is characterised by the fact that schools may not charge
tuition beyond the value of the voucher. This implicates that schools accepting
children from better-off families would not have greater income than schools
with a preponderance of children from poor families. The opposite would be the
case, because children from poor families receive a second, compensatory voucher
that is inversely related to income. In Jencks' scheme schools with pupils from
low income-families receive additional funding.
The total amount of funding the schools receive depends on the number of students
they are able to enrol. As mentioned above, schools are not allowed to ask or
accept fees for education in excess of the voucher value. This holds true even
in cases parents where are willing to supplement ('top-up') the voucher value.
Due to this principle Jencks' voucher scheme aims at prevention of social and
economic segregation, i.e. children cannot be excluded because of the inability
of their parents to pay. Disadvantaged pupils receive on top of the basic voucher
a second, compensatory voucher.
The compensatory model of Jencks introduces the market mechanism to eliminate
the prevailing monopolistic privileges of schools (in the U.S.). However, the
market mechanism is regulated at the same time (fixed prices, compensatory vouchers)
to avoid the negative effects of a completely free education market.
Concluding remarks
Above has been dealt with the essence of three voucher models. However, many
other voucher schemes could be proposed (see e.g. Johnes, 1993). In voucher
schemes there always will be a trade-off between individual freedom of choice
(efficiency) and equality of educational opportunity (equity). Complete individual
freedom of choice results in inequality of educational opportunity. Van Gendt
(1990) formulated this dilemma in the following way:"Because of the situation
that one instrument is supposed to be instrumental to two objectives that are
not obviously compatible, one has to make concessions to the effectiveness of
the instrument for one of these objectives or for two separate objectives."
The Jencks scheme has more of an equalising effect on expenditure. Both exponents
of the liberal market approach (e.g. Friedman) and the social policy approach
(e.g. Jencks) are concerned with consumer sovereignty and efficiency, but proponents
of the social policy approach, like Jencks, place more emphasis on distributional
goals.
In section 2.2 it has been argued that voucher schemes, in the view of its
proponents, will increase efficiency and enhance consumer sovereignty. Parents
choose their child's school and education is (partly) privately produced and
competitive. Schools are forced to be responsive to parental demand. To opponents
of voucher schemes, however, the efficiency advantages are debatable and the
equity effects almost certainly undesirable. The efficiency issue is strongly
related to the answer to the question whether parents are sufficiently well
informed about the standards of their child's school and, if not, whether a
publicly organised inspectorate will be more effective judging the standards
of public and private schools. With regard to equity, opponents of voucher funding
argue that voucher schemes will increase inequalities in the distribution of
education (both quantity and quality) by social class, though less so in the
case of a Jencks type of scheme than under a liberal market approach such as
the Friedman model. As Barr (1998) notes, vouchers might well have advantages
for middle-class families, but only at the expense of less-well informed choices
by lower socio-economic groups. The equity issue therefore can be resolved to
the question what relative weight should be given to the claims of these two
groups.
Regarding voucher schemes, from our point of view two questions are of great
importance:
What empirical evidence is available about voucher schemes? Could the purposes that are underlying the idea of a voucher system also
be pursued in alternative ways?
Question A will be dealt with in section 3. Subsequently, in section 4, attention
will be paid to question B. First, however, we will discuss in section 2.4 the
concept of vouchers in higher education and other forms of post-compulsory education.
2.4 Vouchers in higher education
Most of the voucher schemes proposed in academic literature concern compulsory
education. Regarding higher education and other forms of post-compulsory education,
voucher schemes are rare. The most elaborated and consistent plan seems to be
the voucher model of Levin (1983). The Levin model contains five key elements
(Oosterbeek, 1998):
Students receive vouchers (entitlements). Through their enrolment pattern
they directly determine the amount of funding that higher education institutions
(HEIs) will become. If a student spends a voucher to attend a specific programme
at a HEI of his/her choice, the government is obliged to pay a pre-determined
amount of money to the institution that offers the programme. A prerequisite for a HEI to be eligible for governmental funding is that
it must be accredited. Not only regular institutions, however, are considered
for accreditation. In principle, every supplier of higher education courses
that meets specific quality standards can qualify for accreditation. This
means that new suppliers get a possibility to enter the market. Furthermore,
by not restricting accreditation and governmental funding to the traditional
suppliers of higher education, Levin's voucher scheme can also include on-the-job
training programmes. The voucher is not necessarily a grant, but may also consist of a mixture
of grant and loan. The composition of the voucher, in this respect, may vary
with the type of programme and student characteristics. For example, for studies
that generate relative large externalities (see section 1), the vouchers contain
a large grant component. Moreover, based on equity considerations, it could
be considered to give vouchers with a larger grant-component to students from
low-income families. Another policy option could be to endow students with
lower initial ability with more vouchers than the other students. Finally,
it is important to note that the possibility of a loans component in the voucher
scheme creates the option to combine a voucher scheme with a loan scheme (e.g.
where repayments on loans are based on the income earned by the borrower). Vouchers retain their real value during the entire lifetime of the owner.
This makes it possible to combine a voucher scheme with the policy goal of
lifelong learning, which is becoming more and more important in a knowledge-based
economy. Information plays an important role in a market system, such as a voucher
scheme. Therefore, Levin is aware of the need to provide accurate information
to demanders and providers of higher education and proposes to establish a
special agency to collect and disseminate information about institutions and
courses in the higher education system. Potential students should have quick
access to relevant and accurate information about programmes, course contents,
costs, quality of teachers, labour-market position of graduates, et cetera.
At the same time, suppliers of higher education programmes should be well-informed
about enrolment patterns and new labour-market requirements. The same agency
could play the role of administrator, bookkeeper, controller and collector
of the vouchers.
According to Barr (1998), two questions are central for a discussion about
vouchers in higher education. The first question is: are students capable of
making informed choices? Barr comes to the conclusion that in higher education
consumer tastes are diverse, degrees are becoming more diverse, and change is
increasingly rapid. The most important reason for these developments is the
increasing complexity of our post-industrial society. In Barr's opinion students
are more capable than central planners of making choices on what they want to
study and where they want to study. In his view, the goal of (increasing) consumer
sovereignty can be regarded as more relevant for higher education than for compulsory
education.
The second question is: how useful is competition? Barr concludes that it is
a huge mistake to think that a simple-minded voucher model (HEIs compete for
students; those who attract large numbers flourish, those who fail to attract
enough students will not survive) is the only approach to competition. He argues
that"vouchers should be thought of as a continuum, from 0 per cent constrained
('law of the jungle') to 100 per cent constrained ('pure central planning')
or anywhere in between." Policy-makers should consider a variety of constraints
in choosing their position on this continuum:
Protecting subjects. Some courses (e.g. classics) need special protection,
others need less protection. This can be arranged by tying some vouchers to
specific subjects. Protecting institutions. For reasons of regional balance it could
be necessary to tie vouchers to universities in particular parts of the country. Protecting individuals. There are good reasons to offer larger vouchers
to students from low-income families. Protecting quality. One of the bests arguments in favour of competition
is that competition creates a strong incentive for HEIs to offer quality to
their students. Nevertheless, at the same time it is important to protect
standards, for example by monitoring quality and publishing the results.
All in all, Barr concludes that vouchers allow governmental intervention to
foster both educational and distributional objectives. The degree of competition
is a political matter with different possible policy answers. We would like
to add to Barr's conclusion that vouchers are not the only approach to competition.
We will work out this statement in section 4.
3 Empirical evidence
3.1 Compulsory education
Whilst there has been considerable argument about vouchers, there has been
very little empirical testing of the ideas. With respect to higher education
there is almost no practical evidence at all as we shall see in section 3.2.
Initiatives towards the practical application of educational vouchers in compulsory
education have been proposed in countries with legal impediments to choice.
In the public educational system of countries like this, parents are not free
to select the school of their choice. They are obliged to send their children
to the public school in the immediate region in which they happen to live. If
they do not want to move to another area they are allowed -- as an alternative
-- send their children to private schools. However, this option is not open
to everybody, as it is only available for those who can afford it. Therefore,
many parents have no freedom of choice. They have to send their children to
the local neighbourhood school.
It is pretty obvious that in countries which are characterised by educational
zoning, like the U.S., the U.K. and Australia, the voucher idea will receive
quite a lot of interest. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that a lack of
choice also may be explained by geographical rather than by legal impediments.
This in particular is the case in vast countries with sparsely populated areas
like the U.S. and Australia. It is quite clear that in such cases vouchers hardly
can be regarded as an instrument to increase the number of options. The range
of available options rather is a matter of resources.
With regard to actual or proposed applications of vouchers, again the liberal
market approach and the social policy approach can be distinguished (see section
2.3). Examples of the liberal market approach are New Hampshire and East Hartford
(Connecticut) in the U.S., Kent Country Council in the U.K., and the proposals
suggested by the Federal Liberal Party in Australia. Despite the fact that the
liberal market approach has dominated the analytical discussions on vouchers,
the only actual application of educational vouchers that was carefully prepared
and tested for a period of five years derived from the social policy approach.
This experiment took place in the U.S., namely in Alum Rock (California).
The Alum Rock voucher experiment
In the late 1960s the American Office of Economic Opportunity developed an
interest in vouchers and sought to initiate tests. They experienced considerable
difficulty, because the idea met with opposition wherever it was suggested.
One school district agreed to a trial, namely Alum Rock in the eastern section
of San Jose, California. It would be hard to find a less representative area
to test such a controversial idea. Approximately half of the school children
in Alum Rock are Mexican-American, 40 per cent are Anglo Americans and 10 per
cent are black. Furthermore, most children are from lower class families, and
the population is highly transient with a 30 per cent annual residential turnover.
The basic model used was that of Jencks, with an extra compensatory voucher
for poor children. There was to be a lottery system of admission to schools
whose applications exceeded openings and free transportation for children enrolled
at schools distant from their homes. Teachers' job tenure was guaranteed and
each participating school would offer two or more distinct programme options,
called 'mini-schools', to ensure a wide variety of parental choice.
The experiment was extensively investigated by the Rand Corporation. One of
the claims made for vouchers was that it would increase variety in schools.
Therefore, in Alum Rock great efforts were made to inform parents about the
different programmes offered. However, despite the use of mini-schools, voucher
schools turned out to be very similar to non-voucher schools. Researchers of
the Rand Corporation (Barker et al., 1981) reported:"¡K the voucher system
has not generated educational alternatives that are truly divers ¡K the voucher
classrooms are strikingly similar to the non-voucher classrooms".
Another claim for vouchers was that a voucher system would transfer decision
power from the producers to the consumers, i.e. the parents. However, at Alum
Rock the effects of the experiment were limited, because teacher tenure was
protected. As the demonstration progressed the teachers changed the market aspects
of the voucher scheme to suit their purposes, for example by making it impossible
for schools to expand indefinitely to meet enrolment pressures. There was an
increase in parent initiative -- during the second year about 10% chose non-neighbourhood
schools and after that the proportion rose to 18%. Cohen and Farrar (1977) conclude
that ¡§ the voucher demonstration appreciably increased parental choice among
educational alternatives, but most parents failed to become more autonomous,
powerful or involved".
Teachers experienced both gains and losses. Previously, the curriculum had
been set up by central office staff, but as the scheme progressed there was
an increase in the independence of teachers so that they had more control over
the curriculum. The price they paid for this was a lot more work without additional
payment.
In their analysis of the children's study achievements the Rand researchers
were rather cautious. Nevertheless, they suggest that the introduction of voucher
schools seemed to make little difference to standards. For example, they found
no appreciable or consistent differences in students' reading achievement between
regular and alternative schools. They also found that parental choice was unrelated
to student achievement and concluded that ¡§The justification for implementing
alternative education programs probably should not be based on the promise of
enhanced student outcomes".
Any conclusions derived from Alum Rock must be tentative, partly because one
cannot generalise from one experiment, partly because that experiment was in
such an untypical area. On the positive side, parents were more satisfied and
had more choice of (only public) schools. Nevertheless, the large majority of
Alum Rock parents sent their children to the neighbourhood school. On the negative
side no evidence was presented for an increase of parental influence. On the
contrary, the professionals gained in this respect. The range and nature of
the alternative programs in the mini-schools were devised predominantly by the
teachers themselves.
On the whole the results of the experiment do not support either the great
hopes or fears expressed in the arguments about vouchers.
At the end of the fourth year of the experiment the Education Voucher Advisory
Council (EVAC) in Alum Rock recommended to end the voucher project. The provision
for adjusting programs to parental demand had been diminished considerably.
The inability to adjust physical and personal resources to parental demand implied
that even relatively unpopular schools were guaranteed a substantial enrolment.
This, in combination with the fact that private schools did not participate
in the voucher experiment, and the fact that due to financial stringency a substantial
number of teachers had to be laid off, contributed to the decision to stop the
project. Furthermore, it is important to note that parents, teachers and administrators
were not interested in making the experiment more voucher-like. Finally, the
Alum Rock experiment lacked sufficient federal support. Cohen and Farrar (1977)
put this as follows:"The situation in Washington did not help. Vouchers were
new and controversial, and lacked a real constituency within the government".
Vouchers in the UK
Voucher enthusiasts in the U.K. have not had the opportunity to initiate an
experiment. They did, however, undertake a feasibility study. This took place
in the Ashford division of Kent, an area with 52 maintained schools. The study
made use of questionnaires and interviews. Responses from over 1,200 parents
were overwhelmingly in favour of having more information about schools and greater
parental choice. If parents were to have a voucher, about 13% would be choosing
a different school. However, the great majority of the teachers surveyed were
against the proposals.
The investigation concluded:"The general impression that emerges from responses
to this inquiry is that choice of schools is seen as vital by parents, but that
vouchers would not necessarily be the only or the most satisfactory means of
achieving it. Freedom of choice, the full information about schools necessary
for such choice, the right of transfer between schools and subsidised transport
where necessary to the chosen schools -- these are the critical elements. The
decisive factor in making them possible, with or without vouchers, would be
the availability of surplus capacity in the schools" (Kent County Council Education
Department, 1978).
In 1981, the Assisted Places Scheme, a limited quasi-voucher scheme, was established
in the U.K. with the purpose of giving better opportunities to able but poor
students. Low-income parents may obtain assistance with independent school tuition
fees if the school has been approved by the Department of Education and Science.
By 1992 there were about 27,000 students receiving these"selective vouchers"
which were being ¡§spent" at 295 independent schools. About 5,000 new pupils
enter the scheme every year, mainly at the ages of 11-13 (West, 1996).
3.2 Higher education and other forms of non-compulsory education
Australia
Harman (1999) gives an overview of how Australia recently reviewed higher education
funding. The Review was conducted by a Ministerial appointed committee chaired
by Roderick West, a retired private school headmaster. The West Committee in
many respects was Australia's equivalent of the Dearing Committee in the United
Kingdom. The West Committee presented its Final Report in April 1998 under the
title ¡§Learning for Life".
The Committee recommended a funding and policy framework with:
A student-centred funding system, with public funding for tuition costs
being driven by student choice for both undergraduates and research students,
and with HEIs being able to set their own fee levels. More emphasis on priority setting and national co-ordination in research. A more competitive and entrepreneurial higher education system, better able
to compete internationally and with capacity to make the necessary investments
in information technology and infrastructure.
Under the student-centred funding system, public funding for tuition would
be tied much more closely to demand. All school leavers and adults accessing
post-secondary education for the first time would have a lifelong learning entitlement
that could be used at an existing (private or public) university or vocational
educational training (VET) provider. Institutions would be allowed to set their
own tuition fees and a loan system with repayment contingent on future income
would be available to all students to allow deferment of payment of any tuition
fees not covered by the government entitlement.
The West Committee had deliberately decided not to use the term"voucher", because
much of the community discussion about vouchers ¡§had been irrelevant to the
key policy issue, which concerns the extent to which student choice should determine
the amount of funding that a higher education institution receives" (West Committee,
1998).
Harman (1999) makes clear that, to a large extent, public reaction on Learning
for life was negative, but also predictable. Especially, the proposed student-centred
funding model was criticised. For many this idea was viewed as a right wing
ideological-driven proposal. Moreover, except for a few letters published in
leading newspapers, there was little real community involvement in serious discussion.
All in all, the key recommendations of the West Committee have been largely
ignored, particularly because of opposition from influential stakeholders and
unwillingness by both the government and the opposition Labour Party to make
any commitment to a voucher scheme prior to approaching federal elections.
While the West Committee tried to make clear that it was not especially recommending
a voucher scheme, most of the public discussion assumed that the West Committee's
student-centred funding scheme was, in fact, a voucher scheme. Most of the arguments
used in favour or against voucher or entitlement schemes corresponded closely
to those to be found in the international literature (see section 2). As Harman
(1999) points out, by its proponents vouchers were seen to give more choice
to students, and likely to produce greater efficiencies and increased budget
discretion for institutions, encourage institutions to provide better student
services, and encourage diversity and more flexible staffing arrangements. The
opponents of a voucher scheme in Australia stated that possible difficulties
could be experienced by many students in making rational choices of courses
and institutions. They also had doubts about the value of student choice driving
the higher education system and feared a marked decrease in the central co-ordination
system and the possibility of much weaker mechanisms for adjusting enrolment
patterns to national, social and economic properties. Finally, in their opinion
a voucher scheme could implicate the growth of some universities at the expense
of others and less financial stability for universities from year to year.
A new element in the recent debate in Australia, however, was the emphasis
given by some voucher proponents that a voucher system was likely to give universities
increased protection from government bureaucratic control, and the possibility
that a voucher scheme could be a more attractive and sensible way of using a
fixed quantum of government subsidy in a situation where institutions are suffering
steadily declining income.
A central argument in Harman's overview of the voucher discussion in Australia
is that ¡§while it is highly unlikely that student-centred funding will be implemented
in Australia in the short term, the idea of a voucher or student entitlement
scheme is likely to reappear on the policy agenda before too long, since fundamental
difficulties remain in the current funding arrangements for higher education".
Finland
Ahonen (1996) reports about the findings of a report commissioned by the Finnish
Ministry of Education about how vouchers could be applied in higher education.
The aim of the report was to explore various applications of vouchers and their
effects in Finnish HEIs. Special attention was given to increasing the efficiency
of HEIs and a new funding system in which students would be awarded a stronger
position.
In the report the four main problems of higher education in Finland were identified:
The multiple, simultaneous registration of students in more than one university
which makes admission for newcomers harder. The narrow funding base of HEIs which is limited mainly to governmental
sources. A limited freedom of choice for students. A weak connection between demand and supply.
One of the main issues in Finland is whether society in the near future will
still be able to offer its students unlimited study possibilities (for free)
at various universities. Or should the governmental funding for higher education
be limited? In this context a voucher-based funding model could be a policy
option.
Vouchers are not seen in the more traditional way as a slip of paper having
a certain monetary value, but are defined in terms of time. The question of
(eventually) introducing vouchers in Finnish higher education is looked upon
from the perspective of life-time education opportunities for individuals and
new channels of funding for universities. The basic idea of vouchers, i.e. channelling
the public support via the students, would strengthen the position of students
in making choices and, at the same time, (possibly) improve the quality of teaching,
because universities would have to face increasing competition. Competition
could even be intensified by including the non-university sector of higher education
and foreign universities in the same funding mechanism.
Five different voucher (-like) models were discussed in the ministerial report.
According to the first model the universities would receive all their governmental
funding through vouchers. In practice this would implicate that students get
a voucher account that will be registered by a central agency (e.g. a central
voucher company). For every student at the central agency there would be an
initial voucher deposit in study time, each voucher covering one month's study
at any university in a person's lifetime. Thus, vouchers are related to time,
or possibly to credit points. Universities would receive an authorisation to
charge the students account for the number of months studied (or the number
of credit points). In exchange for the vouchers collected, universities receive
governmental funding, varying per field of study.
In the second model a smaller part of governmental funding, for example 30
per cent, would be allocated through vouchers. The rest of the funding of the
Ministry of Education could be allocated on the basis of performance indicators
(e.g. number of degrees).
In the third model the funding follows the student only when he/she is studying
a major block of courses at another university than his/her "home university".
The aim is to encourage co-operation and mobility between universities by guaranteeing
a clear remuneration for the work done by the university arranging and offering
the courses.
The fourth alternative is a"model of gradual development" in which the aim
would be to develop the existing system gradually into the direction of a voucher-like
system that would contain incentives for both students and universities to support
mobility between universities.
Whereas the four models are (mostly) confined to the university sector, the
fifth model aims at the whole higher education sector. Every Finn would get
at his/her birthday a certain amount of higher education vouchers which can
be used during his/her lifetime at any education institute qualified to be part
of the system. This system would be funded by the government and by local communities.
Once the vouchers are used up, the student (or the employee) has to pay for
his/her further education.
Stakeholders were asked to comment on the ministerial report. Some institutions,
especially student unions, argued that a voucher system does not fit in the
Finnish system of education. Most universities were of the opinion that the
effects of a voucher system should be more thoroughly analysed before any decision
would be taken. It was also stressed that problems related to the transfer period
needed much more attention. The proposal that a special budget could be reserved
for courses at another university than the own university was widely supported.
There was already a move in this direction in the 1996 budget. The implementation,
however, was not very hopeful, because the funds were allocated directly to
the universities, instead of to the students.
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands in 1987 a discussion was initiated about funding the universities
by means of education vouchers. This idea, however, was not accepted by the
Dutch Parliament. Nevertheless the proponents of the voucher concept kept on
advocating the implementation of an entitlement model in Dutch higher education.
In 1993, the Ministry of Education presented its report Blijvend Leren
('Keep on Learning'). Although this report primarily focuses on adult education
it provides at the same time a broad view of the educational system. It analyses
the interrelations between the different education sectors, public and private
education institutions and institutions offering schooling and training for
employed workers and the unemployed. This is all seen from the perspective of
lifelong learning.
The report initiated a lively debate and generated interesting initiatives
to restructure learning and working. In 1995, both the Advisory Council on Education
(ARO) and a Committee advising the Minister of Education on pathways through
the education system (Commissie Leerwegen) presented reports in which enhancing
lifelong learning and the implementation of a voucher scheme were proposed.
An alternative voucher-like scheme was advocated by Van Ravens (1998). This
involves two elements: a lump sum grant by the government to finance post-secondary
school studies but with a rising proportion of self finance with increasing
age; and an open system of learning where competencies will be accredited whether
acquired in the education system, the workplace or the community. The lump sum
grant, which can be used to cover up to 100 per cent of costs for the young,
is seen to offset the difficulties of access to finance when they are greatest
(see section 1). The open system is seen to promote efficiency in the way people
can learn, with a considerable reduction in unit costs. Van Ravens argues:"The
drop-out phenomenon, considered an irreparable loss in a closed system, is a
non-issue here. Everybody drops out all the time and everybody drops back in.
The time it takes to graduate does not need to be reduced and becomes irrelevant".
The ideas of Van Ravens model, however, have not become realised and were discussed
mainly in academic circles.
Recently, a new initiative for voucher funding was undertaken by the Board
for Higher Vocational Education (HBO-Raad), together with the Association
of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (MKB-Nederland). The Ministry of
Education adopted a number of elements of the proposal of these organisations
and decided that in the higher vocational sector two experiments with vouchers
should be started. In September 2000, a small experiment with voucher funding
will be started in the higher vocational education sector; a sector offering
courses with a nominal duration of 4 years. About 10 institutions will participate
in the experiment. After having completed two years of study students can choose
to finish their study at the higher vocational institution or to start work
in a small or medium-sized firm. If the student chooses the second option, the
education institution, the student and the firm will together develop an education
and training plan that matches the specific needs of the job that the student
occupies. For example, in this plan can be stated that the student will follow
certain courses at different higher vocational institutions. The student will
finish his/her study after five years (or a longer period) and pays the institutions
by means of vouchers. The student will fulfil the normal requirements of the
in-school (4 year) curriculum and will be awarded the usual degree. The experiment
will end in September 2003 and will extensively be evaluated.
In 2001, the Ministry of Education intends to start a second, much larger experiment
with voucher funding. Up to now it is not quite clear what the content of the
experiment will be. It may be expected that the first results of the small experiment
will affect the plans for the larger experiment. Also it may be expected that
the second experiment will be extended to other education sectors (e.g. non-compulsory
vocational courses outside the higher vocational sector or some university studies).
The U.K.
Since the early nineties vocational education and training (VET) in the U.K.
knows the Training (or Youth) Credits initiative, which is a voucher-driven
programme of work-based training for school leavers. The assumption underlying
the Training Credits initiative was that if each young person took responsibility
for his/her own education and training and were given a voucher, or Youth Credit,
to buy education or training of their own choice, their individual purchases
would drive the market in training provision. Market provision in turn would
ensure the most efficient use of training resources and force training providers
to raise the quality of their courses in order to attract customers for their
services.
In 1991 the decision was made that Youth Credits should cover the whole of
England, Scotland and Wales by 1996 and should provide education and training
for young people older than 16. Funding for any form of post-16 education or
training will be based on two market reinforcing principles. In the first place,
funding follows recruitment, so that the amount of funding earned by a provider
depends on the number of students or trainees recruited. Secondly, a significant
proportion of the funding is only awarded once the course has been successfully
completed and the qualification awarded. The most important reason for this
form of output funding is that education institutions only recruit those suited
to the courses and that training has to be of high quality, so that the qualification
can be given.
Hodkinson and Sparkes (1995) report on a research investigation into one of
the early Training Credit pilot schemes. They conclude that"this superficially
attractive individualist market model is based on untenable assumptions and
oversimplifications (...) the model is based on a misunderstanding of how young
people make decisions and how training is planned and provided on the ground.
Furthermore, our research suggests that any attempt to control and enhance the
quality of training through a qualifications-driven market is as likely to result
in a decline in training as to raise standards". One of their central points
is that young people make their choices in a pragmatic way instead of in a rational
way. Rational choice analysis is in Hodkinson's and Sparkes's view irrelevant
as a guide to VET policy and practice.
The UK has recently introduced Individual Learning Accounts. The government
will pay ¢G150 into the account after an adult pays in ¢G25. They will be open
to everyone in work, but not in full-time education. The funds can be used for
any course the adult wants. It is expected that many of the account holders
ill spend their funds at the newly founded University for Industry (Ufi) which
will co-ordinate a network of learning centres in traditional education settings
but also in some non-traditional centres like football clubs and churches.
The U.S.
In section 2.4 attention was paid to Levin's voucher model for post-compulsory
education. Implementation of his model will affect both the supply side and
the demand side of the schooling market. On the supply side it may be expected
that new courses will be offered which are aimed at those persons who currently
do not enrol in post-compulsory schooling. These potential students possess
vouchers which represent purchasing power and which education institutions would
like to collect. Oosterbeek (1998) notes that such a new supply will indeed
be offered, as is shown by experience in the U.S. know as the so-called GI
Bill. This law constitutes an experiment with vouchers. The GI Bill utilises
a voucher system in promoting advanced education for U.S. veterans of war (GIs).
The GI Bill has granted entitlement and freedom of choice for those veterans
who wish to pursue a higher education. They are entitled to attend up to 45
months of education during a 10-year period after their active duty (O'Neill,
1977).
The veterans are entitled to receive an allowance if they attend an accredited
schooling or training programme. The allowance may be used either to meet the
direct costs of education or to cover the costs of living. A lower tuition fee
does not affect the allowance. Many newly established courses have been developed
as a consequence of the GI Bill. Many of them were specially geared towards
low-ability veterans and -- measured in terms of their earnings effect -- most
of the offered courses have been a success. Many individuals who would otherwise
not have attended any post-compulsory education are now well-prepared for the
labour market. According to Oosterbeek (1998), this is in contrast with the
objection of antagonists of voucher schemes that a voucher mechanism would lead
to a supply of inferior quality courses. The success of the program is primarily
attributed to an elaborate system of state-approving agencies that closely and
continually have monitored and controlled the program and its participants (Davis,
1983).
4 Conclusions
Many governments are putting increasing pressure on the providers of post-secondary
education to become more efficient and more responsive to client demands. One
of the ways in which the government can try to achieve this is to introduce
a more market-oriented type of funding mechanism in which providers would have
to compete for public funds and would have to respond more strongly to the demands
of their customers. The introduction of vouchers has been suggested, both in
the research literature as well as in the policy field, as a promising alternative
to the traditional supplier-oriented system of allocating government directly
to the providers of education. Although we have identified some differences
in opinion on what actually constitutes a voucher, we have described the voucher
mechanism as a way of funding education through the demand side. This
means that clients (students, pupils) actually receive a voucher, i.e. a coupon
that represents a specified value in terms of consumption of education, that
can be used up in a flexible way for 'buying education' from a range of education
providers that meet specific quality standards. The holder of the voucher him-/herself
would have to make an assessment of where he/she receives the best education
in exchange of the voucher, while the provider would feel an incentive to look
after students.
Based on the extensive academic literature on vouchers, Table 1 gives an overview
of the main arguments that have been put forward in the literature. We have
listed the potential advantages and the potential risks of vouchers. We note
that most of the arguments derive from the US and refer especially to the compulsory
education sector.
Table 1: Pros and cons of vouchers
| pros |
cons |
strengthening student choice strengthening responsiveness to customers increase in diversity of educational services (both in delivery methods and range of programmes) strengthening flexibility in learning routes increase in efficiency of provision increase in quality of provision increase in private contribution to cost of education ('topping up' the voucher) greater opportunities for lower income families and minorities
|
inability of clients to assess information on the quality of education geographical factors will limit choice over-subscription will require rationing (selection) and favour high-income families high administrative complexity (and costs) need for government regulations to protect subjects, individuals, quality and equity large variations in enrolment and funding may lead to under-utilisation of capital and insecure jobs for teachers programmes with high cultural value but with small enrolments will be forced to close if used to the full, vouchers lead to additional government expenditures
|
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